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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the landmark studies by the US GAO (1983) and the United Church of Christ (1987), the 
environmental justice literature has consistently shown that poor and minority households sys-
tematically live in more polluted neighborhoods. This correlation appears to be quite robust to 
the type of pollution considered: for example, the poor live closer to hazardous waste facilities, 
landfills, and other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs); they live closer to large air polluters; 
and they live in communities with higher concentrations of air pollutants.1 The correlation is also 
robust to the statistical methods employed by researchers.2 In short, the correlation qualifies as a 
"stylized fact" as much as anything in social science. 
This finding of a disproportionate environmental burden borne by the poor and people of 
color has led to the introduction of several "environmental justice acts" in Congress (though none 
have passed) and to President Clinton's Executive Order 12898. Still in force, the order requires 
nondiscrimination in federal environmental programs and focuses federal resources, such as 
EPA's brownfield program, on low-income and minority communities. More recently, the EPA 
has launched a number of initiatives to incorporate environmental justice considerations into its 
rule making. 
In addition to such top-down initiatives, the environmental justice findings have fed 
grassroots activist movements. Sometimes with help from national leaders of the environmental 
justice movement, local stakeholders have sought more involvement in permitting polluting 
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facilities and in making other environmental plans.3 They also have filed lawsuits against gov-
ernments for discriminatory environmental enforcement and against polluters for environmental 
nuisances. For example, in one prominent case, local activists forced California's Southeast Air 
Quality Management District to settle a suit over the geographic distribution of trades under its 
RECLAIM pollution trading program.4 
Evaluating claims of discrimination and injustice requires an understanding of the social 
causes lying behind the correlation between pollution and demographics. So does evaluating the 
efficacy of any policy remedies. Economic models can provide important insights into these is-
sues. These include economic models of discrimination, of local public goods and real estate 
markets, of firms' profit maximization, and of political organization and lobbying. Generally 
speaking, these models have tended to "push back" the locus of injustice from firms' individual 
decisions, such as where to locate and how to operate, to the more fundamental issue of the dis-
tribution of income and wealth and the ways in which markets allocate goods—including envi-
ronmental amenities—to households. This point has been made well both by critics and partici-
pants in the environmental justice movement, and has been discussed fruitfully by such authors 
as Vicki Been (1993, 1994), Lynn Blais (1996), Sheila Foster (1998), Laura Pulido (2000) and 
others. 
Despite the importance of the question, we do not really understand which socio-eco-
nomic forces lie behind the observed correlations. Moreover, the full implication of these various 
economic models for the distributional impacts of potential policy remedies for environmental 
injustice has not been well understood either. Yet if the ultimate social goal is actually to im-
prove the welfare of disadvantaged groups, as well as to describe social processes, understanding 
the distributional effects of environmental policies is crucial. These distributional effects will in 
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turn depend on the social process generating the observed pattern in the distribution of pollution. 
Consequently, the social forces driving the poor's exposure to pollution represent a critical la-
cuna in our understanding. 
1.2 The Lone Mountain Forum 
For this reason, we felt it was time to re-visit environmental justice questions, with a concen-
trated effort to flesh out the economic and social dynamics lying behind the observed correlation 
between pollution and demographics. The opportunity to make that effort came with a Lone 
Mountain Forum, organized by the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC). The fo-
rum was made possible with generous support from the Earhart Foundation. 
The authors of the papers included in this volume gathered together in Big Sky, MT, in 
October 2008. The authors were all economists, but our group also contained a mix of additional 
economists and legal scholars who joined us in the dialogue.5 Additionally, the group included a 
mix of scholars long engaged in the environmental justice literature as well as others who were 
new to it, who brought fresh perspectives. 
One thing we did not try to do was to revisit the question of whether or not there is a cor-
relation between pollution and the presence of poor or minority households. Granting the pres-
ence of at least a simple correlation, we came rather to discuss questions about the economic 
forces lying behind it, seeking to gain insights from both theoretical models and empirical anal-
yses. We also wanted to explore the implications of these insights for public policy.  
The papers in this volume are the fruits of that meeting. While they all come from the 
perspective of economists, our hope is that they will of use to all participants in environmental 
justice conversations, including legal scholars, sociologists, geographers, philosophers, and his-
torians, whether in academia, government, business, or community organizations.  
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These research questions and their intended audience motivated the title of the collected 
volume, The Political Economy of Environmental Justice. The term "political economy" conveys 
the discipline of economics lying at the heart of the volume, of course, but it has numerous addi-
tional shades of meaning beyond simply "economics." It can mean the economic analysis of poli-
tics and public choice, including interest-group politics, regulation, and redistribution. It can 
mean simply wedding economics to public policy. And it has an older, archaic meaning growing 
out of its roots in moral philosophy, as the more comprehensive study of societies and states in 
all their economic, political, legal, and moral aspects. All of these meanings are meant to be 
packed into this term which serves as the volume's title. 
1.3 Economic Models of Environmental Justice 
Economists' perspective on environmental justice issues was articulated first and best by James 
Hamilton (1995). Hamilton identified three broad categories of explanations for environmental 
justice correlations: pure discrimination, economic efficiency, and political action. Promoting 
some of his subcategories and adding another, I will consider these in six categories. 
The first category is "pure discrimination." Following the model of Becker (1957), this 
notion is that firms may have a differential preference for sheltering whites from pollution, or 
even a perverse desire to harm minorities. Essentially, firms act to achieve a set of objectives 
which include not only profits, but also discriminatory preferences for environmental outcomes 
on different demographic groups. Firms would thus make production decisions that harm minori-
ties even if it is not in their own profit-maximizing interests, paying a price in foregone profits to 
indulge their discriminatory tastes. Believing firms focus solely on profits, economists tend to be 
skeptical of this explanation. 
A second interpretation, known as "coming to the nuisance," essentially reverses the 
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causality. Firms site their facilities and make other production decisions for numerous reasons, 
and local demographics may be a negligible factor. If they do emit pollution in any given loca-
tion, for whatever reason, however, it will make that location less attractive to residents. Wealth-
ier households in particular, with more opportunities, will move out, lowering demand for hous-
ing in the area. Consequently, local land and housing prices will fall. Poorer households may ac-
tually move in, prioritizing the low housing costs despite the disamenity of the pollution. This 
process was well articulated by Vicki Been in a series of influential papers (1993, 1994, 1997), 
as well as by Hamilton (1995) and Blais (1996). Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) and Banzhaf, Sidon, 
and Walsh (this volume) confirm this intuition in a formal economic model in the style of Tie-
bout (1956), in which households choose neighborhoods in which to live based on local ameni-
ties and costs (including property prices and tax rates). 
In this way, the demographics might follow the spatial distribution of the pollution. As 
long as there is some pollution, pollution must have a spatial distribution, and so somebody will 
be nearest to it. As emphasized by Charles Tiebout himself, these models suggest that ultimately 
the spatial distribution of pollution is economically efficient. The term "efficient" is a linguistic 
minefield, which can lead to substantial misunderstanding between economics and others. To 
economists, it means simply that households with the highest values for a cleaner environment—
those with the highest willingness to pay, in economists' jargon—do in fact avoid it in the end. 
Conversely, those with the lowest willingness to pay for a cleaner environment—those least will-
ing to sacrifice other goods like housing, food, or entertainment—are the ones living nearest the 
pollution. 
If people's values for avoiding pollution differ because of differences in family makeup 
(e.g. the presence of children or the elderly), physical sensitivity to pollution (e.g. having 
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asthma), or similarly formed preferences, then the allocation would seem quite sensible indeed. 
However, these values also proceed from people's ability to pay, based on their income. This 
raises additional questions about the nature of injustice, but pushes those questions back to the 
underlying distribution of income itself as the more fundamental issue. That is, the question turns 
to why particular groups or individuals are poor in the first place, and hence unable to acquire 
some of the good things in life—a clean environment included. 
A third, and closely related, interpretation is that the geographic pattern of local environ-
mental nuisances arises from negotiations between firms and local stakeholders, in which firms 
compensate communities for hosting unwanted facilities (Hamilton 1993, 1995). As Ronald 
Coase (1960) famously argued, such negotiations would arise when the right to pollute (or to be 
free of pollution) is clearly defined and when the costs of negotiation and transacting compensa-
tory payments are low.  
Coase (1960) pointed out that when property rights are well defined, they also become 
tradable. Specifying the right to pollute—or to be free from pollution—allows pollution too to be 
traded. Coase suggested, for example, that negotiations could arise over factory smoke. If facto-
ries have a right to pollute, local residents may pay them to not pollute. If local residents have a 
right to be free from pollution, factories might compensate them to accept some pollution. In the 
same way as can happen through land markets, environmental quality will again be highest near 
those who value it most highly, and lowest near those who are prepared—for whatever reason—
to sacrifice fewer other goods to obtain it. 
In this Coasian world, other things equal, firms would locate in neighborhoods that are 
willing to accept lower payments as compensation. Like the Tiebout model, the Coasian model 
implies that the spatial distribution of pollution is economically efficient, but again only 
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conditional upon the existing distribution of income. The primary difference between the two 
models is that Coase's is a story of firms choosing a location based on its negotiations with local 
residents, whereas Tiebout's is a story of households choosing a location based on its existing 
amenities and prices. 
Fourth, firms may seek out areas with weaker political resistance to their polluting activi-
ties. If local residents must use costly political action to fend off unwanted pollution, then the 
level of their political resistance is likely to be proportionate to their willingness to pay to avoid 
pollution. In this way, political wrangling can be, for all practical purposes, a special form of the 
pricing mechanism operating through the Coasian process, and so too the outcome might be effi-
cient in the same way—again, conditional on the existing income distribution (Becker 1983).6 
Those with the highest willingness to pay to avoid pollution invest the most in pollution-resisting 
activism; meanwhile, firms seek to avoid paying the political cost of trying to overcome such ac-
tivism, and so avoid those communities. 
However, the strength or weakness of a community's political opposition may not, in fact, 
be proportionate to their desire to avoid pollution. Some communities may have better access to 
the hall of power than others. Others may be better organized politically or, in Coasian language, 
may face lower transactions costs of coming together to negotiate with (or oppose) polluting 
firms. Hamilton (1993, 1995), for example, found that communities with lower voter turnout 
were more likely to see local firms expand their processing of hazardous wastes (see also Brooks 
and Sethi 1997 and Arora and Cason 1999). From this perspective, environmental justice activ-
ists who provide legal advice and facilitate local capacity building in poor neighborhoods are 
achieving two ends: they are serving the poor while helping these social processes to function 
more efficiently, lowering Coasian transactions costs. 
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A fifth interpretation is that firms, while not reacting so much to local demographics per 
se, are attracted to other factors which happen to be spatially correlated with the demographic 
composition of neighborhoods. Examples of such factors might include low wages, low land 
prices, access to transportation corridors, and proximity to suppliers or to other similar firms (be-
cause of so-called "agglomeration economies"). Wolverton (2009 and this volume) finds that 
such factors do appear to be one of the main drivers behind firms' location decisions. Some of 
these factors, like low wages, might in fact be demographic characteristics. Other factors might 
be correlated with demographics indirectly through Tiebout-like processes. For example, nearby 
transportation corridors may be an attractive amenity to firms but a disamenity to households, 
one that drives away the richer residents. Or, the age of a community's housing stock might well 
be tied historically to the development of nearby manufacturing, and it may be the lifecycle of 
the housing stock that drives the observed correlations. Research by Rosenthal (2008) and 
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) shows that a community's population tends to grow poorer over 
time along with the age of the housing stock, until the community reaches a time of redevelop-
ment and renewal. Further exploration of this so-called "filtering" model in the environmental 
justice context would be fruitful.  
A sixth and final interpretation focuses attention not so much on firms as on government, 
and its failure to enforce environmental standards and regulations equitably. Governments might, 
for example, enforce such provisions more rigorously in areas with higher levels of political sup-
port for the current administration. But they need not be intentionally discriminatory for such 
outcomes to arise. Government enforcement agencies may find it easier or even more efficient to 
react to complaints from local citizens. But as with the "squeaky wheel that gets the grease," 
those agencies would be more likely to respond to better organized, better connected, and 
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otherwise more politically powerful citizens (see McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, Hamilton and 
Viscusi 1999). If environmental justice communities are more poorly organized or politically 
connected, this dynamic would give rise to the observed environmental justice correlations. (If 
so, this might also be a further reason why firms would be attracted to areas with less political 
power.) 
1.4 Why Why Matters 
No doubt others would be able to offer additional explanations, but these are the ones most likely 
to occur to most economists. Even the very act of listing them out can help overcome a common 
misunderstand between economists and others about the idea of "environmental justice" or "envi-
ronmental racism." When an economist hears these terms, he typically thinks in terms of the first 
model described above, the story of pure discrimination, in which firms sacrifice profits in order 
to steer pollution toward less-valued groups. Interpreting "discrimination" or "injustice" through 
the lens of this particular model, economists and many social scientists have tended to subject 
environmental justice correlations to various controls, through multivariate regression for exam-
ple. If the correlation between pollution and poor and/or minority populations disappears when 
controlling for other factors, such as education, land values, or voting turnout, then economists 
often conclude that there is no environmental justice concern. Indeed, they too often conclude 
that environmental justice advocates and researchers from other disciplines are simply naïve. 
In fact, if we economists would spend a little more time in the environmental justice liter-
ature, we would realize that very few people have ever made the suggestion that firms' tastes for 
something like "pure discrimination" are responsible for the observed correlations. Most are well 
aware of the socioeconomic processes involved. Indeed, many scholars, like Bullard (1990), Fos-
ter (1998) and Pulido (2000) for instance, have articulated nuanced conceptual frameworks for 
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interpreting environmental justice questions, frameworks which exhibit a grasp of the economic 
issues that might surprise some economists. 
From the point of view of many of these alternative frameworks, the fact that market 
and/or political forces lead to the observed correlations between pollution and demographics 
does not render the question of an "injustice" moot. Indeed, consider the US EPA's definition of 
environmental justice: 
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the de-
velopment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, 
and policies. EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across this Na-
tion. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from 
environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making pro-
cess to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work. (US EPA 
2010) 
Bryant (1995) defines it this way: 
[Environmental justice] refers to those cultural norms and values, rules, regula-
tions, behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable communities, 
where people can interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurtur-
ing and productive. Environmental justice is served when people can realize their 
highest potential, without experiencing the "isms." Environmental justice is sup-
ported by decent paying and safe jobs; quality schools and recreation; decent 
housing and adequate health care; democratic decision-making and personal em-
powerment; and communities free of violence, drugs, and poverty. These are 
communities where both cultural and biological diversity are respected and highly 
revered and where distributive justice prevails. (p. 6) 
Of the two, Bryant's is clearly the more holistic, encompassing a wide range of issues only indi-
rectly connected to the natural environment. But the key point is that both definitions encompass 
notions of procedural justice as well as distributive justice, while neither focuses on the question 
of the intent of polluters.7 
Beyond clarifying the vocabulary of "discrimination," understanding which of these ex-
planations are the most significant is important for three additional reasons. First, it colors the 
interpretation of the injustice in the distribution of pollution. Second, it has implications for the 
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efficacy of policies designed to reverse environmental justice correlations. And third, it has im-
plications for the actual welfare effects on the poor of cleaning up their neighborhoods. 
If the correlation between pollution and minority and poor populations results from inten-
tional discrimination by government agencies, it would violate the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution and possibly Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (which prevents discrimination by 
agencies receiving federal funds).8 Even if there was no discriminatory intent, there would still 
be a question of the justice in the agencies' procedures as well as distributive justice. 
If the observed correlations are a consequence of "coming to the nuisance" and similar 
socio-economic processes mediated through real estate markets and housing decisions, however, 
then the correlation between pollution and demographics appears not so much a cause of an une-
qual distribution as a result. In this case, there is still a question of distributive injustice, but the 
locus of that injustice lies in the underlying distribution of income rather than in the distribution 
of environmental quality. 
The environmental justice literature, by and large, has acknowledged the potential role 
played by market dynamics while arguing that such processes do not undermine the normative 
significance of the injustice of disproportionate environmental burdens. Be that as it may, it does 
not follow that understanding such social processes are irrelevant. However unfair the distribu-
tion of income, markets provide an effective opportunity for individuals and groups to enhance 
their welfare, given their limited resources. It follows that if market-based processes (such as 
Tieboutian allocations mediated through real estate markets and Coasian bargaining over pollu-
tion itself) are important, then undermining the market outcomes may undermine the efforts of 
even the most disadvantaged groups to better themselves. Focusing on the root problem—pov-
erty—by redistributing income is likely to be a more effective way to improve the welfare of the 
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poor than improving environmental quality. 
For example, a Tiebout process of "coming to the nuisance" would undermine the effi-
cacy of any policies designed to reverse the correlation through the targeting of firm behavior. 
As pointed out by Been (1993), as long as some areas are more polluted than others, migration 
might always re-establish the correlation. Perhaps more importantly and more surprisingly, the 
process would have important and counter-intuitive implications for household welfare. For in-
stance, Sieg et al. (2004) and Walsh (2007) find that targeting dirty, poor neighborhoods for 
clean-up with the intention of helping the local residents can be counter-productive. The reason 
is that residents who live in dirtier communities tend to place a high priority on low-cost housing 
relative to the environment, presumably because they cannot afford to sacrifice such necessities 
given their limited finances. In contrast, new residents who move in following a cleanup have a 
higher willingness to pay for environmental quality. As they move in, they bid property values 
up by their own higher willingness to pay. Thus, cleaning up the environment may increase 
housing costs for the poor by more than their willingness to pay. Moreover, as they generally 
rent their housing, poor residents stand to lose from these increased housing costs, while land-
lords reap the benefit. Sieg et al. (2004) refer to this effect as "environmental gentrification." 
Such perverse distributional effects are not only a concern of the academic literature: they have 
emerged as a top concern of grassroots movements as well, as expressed in a recent report from 
the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC 2006). This issue of environmen-
tal gentrification is discussed in more detail in Banzhaf and McCormick (this volume) and 
Vigdor (this volume). 
1.5 Role of Housing Discrimination 
One theme in the economic approach to environmental justice that has emerged is the importance 
1-13 
 
of market processes in allocating pollution, as a more subtle yet more realistic process than pure 
discrimination in production decisions. But this begs the question, what about discrimination in 
those mediating markets, especially the real estate market? 
The question pushes the logic back one step, but many of the principles are the same. The 
most overt possibility here is pure discrimination in the housing market. In this case, pure dis-
crimination is, on the face of it, more plausible, though discriminating sellers or real estate agents 
must still pay a price for their discrimination in the form of foregone customers. Nevertheless, 
historically, pure discrimination in the housing market has taken the form of neighborhood cove-
nants and the refusal to sell or rent to individuals of color. But there is an indirect version of dis-
crimination here as well. A more subtle form of discrimination is the decision of individuals to 
live (or not live) in a neighborhood based on its demographic composition. For example, segre-
gation will arise if whites prefer to live with other whites, as evidenced in processes such as 
"white flight." Importantly, the converse does not necessarily follow: the existence of segrega-
tion does not necessarily imply such indirect discrimination. It could follow, for example, from 
the Tiebout process and inter-racial differences in willingness to pay for public goods (Mcguire 
1974). 
Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999), in their fascinating historical study of segregation in 
America from 1890 to 1990, found that the pattern of housing costs for blacks and whites sug-
gests that pure discrimination marked the rise of segregation in the first two-thirds of the twenti-
eth century, but that the more implicit form, based on individual residential choices, was more 
salient by 1980.9 Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), for example, estimate that in most cities, 
whites begin to flee neighborhoods when minorities comprise 5 to 20 percent of the population. 
These estimates are consistent with survey findings about whites' tolerance for minority 
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neighbors. Blacks, on the other hand, state that they prefer a 50-50 mix of racial composition 
(Farley et al. 1978 and Farley and Krysan 2002). 
Such housing market behavior can magnify the consequences of the Tiebout model for 
environmental justice. As shown by Schelling (1971, 1972), even when everybody prefers some 
integration, such preferences can result in a "tipping point" at which communities become quite 
segregated. When combined with the Tiebout model, it is not surprising that whites enjoy the 
high-amenity areas (see Becker and Murphy 2000, Banzhaf and Walsh 2010, Banzhaf, Sidon, 
and Walsh, this volume). These areas have higher land values not only because of their environ-
mental amenities, but also because the white majority values them simply because they are more 
white. This white premium becomes yet another force driving minorities to more polluted com-
munities: not only must they join white communities to obtain high levels of public goods, risk-
ing being the odd man out, they must pay extra for the privilege (Ford 1994). Consistent with 
these hypotheses, Depro and Timmins (this volume) find preliminary evidence that minorities 
face a higher opportunity cost of obtaining clean air than do whites. 
1.6 Advancing the Ball 
The papers in this volume all speak to one or more of these issues, either testing various eco-
nomic theories of environmental justice correlations, working out hypotheses about their respec-
tive implications for public policy, or testing those derived hypotheses. A plurality of the papers 
explore various aspects of Tiebout's hypothesis that real estate markets mediate the exposure of 
demographic groups to pollution. Reviewing the evidence, Eleanor McCormick and I find sub-
stantial support for this mechanism (Chapter 2). We also find evidence of gentrification effects 
on prices. Brooks Depro and Christopher Timmins (Chapter 5) provide additional evidence of 
Tiebout's process in a detailed study of households' responses to ozone improvements. Whites 
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appear to be more likely to move up to low-ozone neighborhoods when they move than do 
Blacks or Hispanics.  
On the other hand, in Chapter 6, Trudy Ann Cameron, Graham Crawford, and Ian 
McConnaha do not find such systematic patterns in their examination of the evolving de-
mographics around superfund sites. They point out that white males tend to view environmental 
risks as smaller, so minority and female-headed households may be less likely to "move to the 
nuisance." Moreover, they point out that observing these patterns in the data over time is compli-
cated by the changing perceptions of risks as some contaminated sites are either cleaned up or 
alternatively permanently stigmatized. 
Other papers exploring the issue add additional nuance to our understanding of gentrifica-
tion. Jacob Vigdor (Chapter 3) points out that if environmental justice communities have many 
vacant houses, then the excess housing supply may be more than sufficient to absorb the increase 
in demand following cleanup, so investments in environmental justice communities may not trig-
ger price increases. Similarly, Douglas Noonan (Chapter 7) points out that many projects involve 
redevelopment. If the increased supply from the new development balances the increased de-
mand from the improved amenities, then there will not be any price effect. Neither author finds 
evidence of price appreciation in the applications they consider, cleanup of Superfund sites in the 
former case and a brownfield-to-greenfield project in the latter. Finally, in Chapter 4, Joshua Si-
don, Randall Walsh, and I consider the case where households sort on the demographic composi-
tion of the community as well as amenities like the local environment. Such preferences rein-
force the observed environmental justice correlations, but also dampen gentrification effects. 
Ann Wolverton (Chapter 8) offers what may be the strongest analysis of firm locational 
choice in this literature. She finds that when firms site their polluting facilities, they prioritize 
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factors that likely lower their operating costs, locating in areas with lower wages, with good ac-
cess to transportation, and with existing activity in their industry. After controlling for these fac-
tors, the racial composition and income of communities do not appear to be a factor. 
There thus seems to be substantial evidence for the second hypothesis for observed envi-
ronmental justice correlations discussed above (mediation through land markets) and the fifth 
(profit-maximizing locational choices by firms). However, progress is not made only by verify-
ing ideas. Eliminating hypotheses is just as useful. In Chapter 9, Ronald Shadbegian and Wayne 
Gray consider the sixth hypothesis, discrimination by governments. They test for variation in 
states' pollution enforcement activity based on local demographics, and find no connection (with 
the exception that liberal areas get more enforcement and conservative areas less). Similarly, in 
Chapter 10, Robin Jenkins and Kelly Maguire find no connection between state taxes on hazard-
ous wastes and local demographics. 
This still leaves at least two important economic theories which were not explored by the 
authors in this volume. One is Coase's theory of compensatory transactions for pollution. There 
is some evidence that Coasian processes are functioning in local pollution markets. For example, 
in their study of the largest solid-waste landfills in the U.S., Jenkins, Maguire, and Morgan 
(2004) find that about half of the landfill owners provide compensation to communities, with 
payments averaging about $1.5 million in 1996, and in one case $20 million. Forty-six percent 
made regular cash payments and 36 percent made miscellaneous in-kind payments, such as 
wells, parks, firehouses, and so forth. Thus, although not universal and although probably ham-
pered by high transactions costs, Coase's mechanism appears to be working, at least to some ex-
tent. 
The second hypotheses that the papers in this volume do not directly address is the role of 
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political power and local interest groups in firms' pollution decisions. As noted previously, pol-
luting firms may avoid communities that are better organized and have more political power, and 
Hamilton (1993, 1995) presented evidence on the importance of these factors, as measured by 
voter turnout. Since Hamilton's seminal work on this topic, new developments in the political 
economy have opened up potentially new lines of inquiry. For example, Alesina, Baqir, and 
Easterly (1999) have hypothesized that areas with more demographic heterogeneity will have the 
hardest time assembling for collective action. They find that more heterogeneous communities 
have lower levels of public goods. Similarly, Vigdor (2004) finds that such communities have 
lower response rates for the US Census, despite the fiscal advantages to a community of respond-
ing. Similar organizational problems may plague heterogeneous communities when it comes to 
negotiating (or opposing) polluting facilities (Videras and Bordoni 2006). 
Both these areas are worthy of further exploration, as are no doubt all those discussed in 
this volume. If the volume succeeds as we hope, it will be in its role as a conversation starter that 
motivates still more exploration of those topics.  
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Notes 
1 On the location of landfills and hazardous waste facilities, see US GAO (1983), United Church 
of Christ (1987, 2007), Goldman and Fitton (1994), Baden and Coursey (2002), Been (1997), 
Boer et al. (1997), Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp (2001), Saha and Mohai (2005), Mohai and Saha 
(2006), and Maantay (2007). On the presence of large polluters, see Hersh (1995), Ringquist 
(1997), Sadd et al. (1999), Fisher, Kelly, and Romm (2006), and Banzhaf, Sidon, and Walsh (this 
volume). On the emissions of air pollutants, see Kriesel, Centner, and Keeler (1996), Brooks and 
Sethi (1997), Rinquist (1997), Arora and Cason (1999), and Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch 
(2004, 2007); and on estimated air pollution concentrations, see Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and 
Sadd (2001), Ash and Fetter (2004), Fisher, Kelly, and Romm (2006), Pastor, Sadd, and Mo-
rello-Frosch (2007), and Depro and Timmins (this volume). 
Bullard (1990) is the classic book-length introduction to the entire literature. For more recent 
reviews and discussion, see Cole and Foster (2001), Bowen (2002), Pastor (2002), Ringquist 
(2003), Brulle and Pellow (2006), and Noonan (2008). See Ringquist (2005) for a meta-analysis. 
2 An exception is the sensitivity of the results to spatial scale, with evidence of the correlation be-
tween pollution and demographics stronger at smaller, more disaggregate scales. See Mohai and 
Saha (2006), Baden, Noonan, and Turaga (2007), and Noonan, Turaga, and Baden (2009). 
3 In addition to impeding new permits, sometimes these activities include bargaining for compen-
sation (Jenkins et al. 2004). 
4 See Lazarus 2000, Binder et al. 2001, and the United Church of Christ (2007) on the tangible 
successes of the environmental justice movement. 
5 We particularly thank Joseph Aldy, Vicki Been, Robert Deacon, and Jason Johnston for their 
very valuable and constructive comments. 
6 Alchian and Demsetz (1973) point out that ownership is equivalent to the rights to use a re-
source. Because there may be many uses, property rights are almost infinitely divisible. The 
owner of "the right" to use of a parcel of land, for example, may differ for the right to occupancy, 
the mineral rights, water rights, right-of-way, and so forth. In the same way, even if common law 
does not give communities a right to be free from pollution, statutory or administrative law may 
give communities the right to contest the permitting process for citing a facility nearby. It is this 
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right which may give rise to Coasian bargaining, even without plain and unambiguous property 
rights over every aspect of the resources at stake. Indeed, such actions lie at the heart of the envi-
ronmental justice movement's strategy today. 
7 Loosely, procedural justice in this context refers to the fairness of the processes that determine 
the ultimate spatial distribution of pollution. EPA is, naturally, focused on the fairness of federal 
rule-making, but others would emphasize other processes, including business planning, political 
negotiation, and even the market itself. Distributive justice refers to the fairness or equity of the 
ultimate distribution of pollution itself. So long as there is a correlation between pollution and 
demographics, there is at least a prima facie case for distributive injustice, however it arises. On 
the inter-relationship between procedural and distributive justice issues in the environmental 
context, see Foster (1998) and Banzhaf (2011). 
8 At one time, environmental justice activists sought a remedy in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 
under rules for agencies using federal money. These rules required only proof of discriminatory 
effect rather than proof of intent. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 2001 in Alexander v. 
Sandoval (532 U.S. 275) that there was no private right of action to enforce such regulations. 
9 The tide against explicit discrimination began to turn with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), striking down restrictive covenants, and with passage of the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968. While the existence of overt discrimination in housing markets did not im-
mediately disappear, its importance has steadily declined. Nevertheless, discriminatory practices 
are believed to continue to play a role in the locational opportunities of different racial groups 
(see Turner et al. 2002, Hanson and Hawley 2011). 
